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Abstract : Hamilton’s theory of kin selection is the best-known framework for understanding the5
evolution of social behaviour, but has long been a source of controversy in evolutionary biology.6
A recent critique of the theory by Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson sparked a new round of debate,7
which shows no signs of abating. In this overview we highlight a number of conceptual issues8
that lie at the heart of the current debate. We begin by emphasizing that there are various9
alternative formulations of Hamilton’s rule, including a ‘general’ version that is always true, an10
‘approximate’ version that assumes weak selection, and a ‘special’ version that demands other11
restrictive assumptions. We then examine the relationship between the ‘neighbour-modulated12
fitness’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ approaches to kin selection. Finally, we consider the often strained13
relationship between the theories of kin and multi-level selection.14
Keywords: Hamilton’s rule, social evolution, kin selection, inclusive fitness, multi-level selection15
16
Introduction17
The pithiest expression of the concept of kin selection was made long before the theory itself was18
devised, when J.B.S. Haldane is said to have quipped “I would lay down my life for two brothers19
or eight cousins”. The remark captures an intuitive and powerful thought: when interacting20
organisms share genes, they may have an evolutionary incentive to help each other. Moreover,21
and more profoundly, it suggests that the size of the incentive to help is proportional to the22
degree of relatedness between them. We owe the formal embodiment of this insight to Hamilton23
(1964), and the term ‘kin selection’ to Maynard Smith (1964). Today, Hamilton’s theory lies24
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at the heart of an established and sizeable research program, the explanatory domain of which25
has steadily expanded (Bourke 2011a).26
The basic empirical prediction of kin selection theory is that social behaviour should correlate27
with genetic relatedness; in particular, ‘altruistic’ actions – which are costly to the actor but28
benefit others – are more likely to be directed towards relatives. This qualitative prediction has29
been amply confirmed in diverse taxa, including microbes, insects and vertebrates. Moreover,30
kin selection has shed light on a range of biological phenomena including dispersal, sex-ratio31
allocation, worker-queen conflicts in insect colonies, the distribution of reproduction in animal32
societies (‘reproductive skew’), parasite virulence, genomic imprinting, the evolution of multi-33
cellularity, and more (Bourke 2011a). The principles of kin selection also help illuminate aspects34
of the ‘major transitions in evolution’, which occur when free-living individuals coalesce to form35
a new higher-level entity which eventually becomes an ‘individual’ itself (Maynard Smith and36
Szathma´ry 1995; Bourke 2011a).37
Despite its empirical success, kin selection theory is not without its critics. For example38
E. O. Wilson, the famous author of Sociobiology, was once an enthusiastic supporter of kin39
selection but has changed his mind. In their recent work on eusocial insect colonies, Wilson40
and his co-author Bert Ho¨lldobler argue that genetic relatedness is less important than is often41
thought; on their view, ecological factors, rather than high levels of within-colony relatedness,42
are the primary drivers of the evolution of eusociality (Wilson and Ho¨lldobler 2005, Ho¨lldobler43
and Wilson 2008).44
In August 2010, a strongly-worded critique of kin selection by Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson45
(2010) ignited a new round of debate in Nature. In March 2011, a rebuttal was published46
signed by 137 social evolution theorists, who claimed that Nowak and colleagues’ arguments “are47
based on a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory, and a misrepresentation of the empirical48
literature” (Abbot et al. 2011, p. E1). More detailed rebuttals have since appeared (Rousset49
and Lion 2011; Gardner et al. 2011; Bourke 2011b), plus a response by Nowak and colleagues50
(Nowak et al. 2011). Follow-up critiques by van Veelen et al. (2012), Wilson (2012), Allen et51
al. (2013) and Wilson and Nowak (2014) have left continuing uncertainty about the status of52
Hamilton’s theory. Does it lie in tatters? Or is it alive and kicking, healthier than ever? It53
depends on who you ask.54
In this overview, we offer a fresh look at some of the issues raised by this debate. As55
philosophers of science, rather than practising biologists, we hope to bring a certain detachment56
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to the discussion. Our aim is not to debunk or vindicate kin selection, nor to take a stand on any57
empirical questions, but to offer some conceptual clarifications. In Section 2, we discuss the core58
explanatory principle of kin selection theory, ‘Hamilton’s rule’. We emphasize that although59
the name suggests a single, unambiguous principle, there are in fact various formulations of60
the rule which it is crucial to distinguish. In Section 3, we examine the relationship between61
the ‘neighbour-modulated fitness’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ approaches to kin selection, and look62
briefly at the idea that inclusive fitness is the quantity that organisms should appear designed63
to maximize. In Section 4, we examine the often strained relationship between the theories of64
kin and group selection, and ask whether these theories are ultimately equivalent, as is often65
claimed. In Section 5, we close by highlighting some outstanding issues.66
The status of Hamilton’s rule67
The central explanatory principle of kin selection theory is ‘Hamilton’s rule’, which says that68
a gene coding for a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection if and only if rb > c,69
where b represents the ‘benefit’ the behaviour confers on the recipient, c represents the ‘cost’70
it imposes on the actor, and r is the ‘coefficient of relatedness’ between actor and recipient71
(Hamilton 1964). The costs and benefits are measured in increments of reproductive fitness.72
The rule tells us that an altruistic behaviour will be favoured by selection so long as the fitness73
cost to the actor is offset by a sufficient amount of benefit to sufficient closely related recipients.74
In contemporary discussions, r is intended to encompass any relevant genetic similarity be-75
tween actors and recipients, regardless of the mechanism that led to it. Hence although Hamilton76
originally defined r in genealogical terms, as a measure of shared ancestry, in principle Hamil-77
ton’s rule still applies when genetic correlations arise by other means, including ‘greenbeard’78
effects (Dawkins 1976; Gardner and West 2010), pleiotropic effects (Hamilton 1975), and, in79
microbes, gene mobility (Mc Ginty et al. 2013; Birch 2014a). In practice, however, genealogical80
kinship remains the most common source of genetic correlation between social partners.81
In their 2010 paper, Nowak et al. (2010) say that Hamilton’s rule “almost never holds”82
(p. 1059), in the sense that it almost never constitutes a true statement of the conditions under83
which a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection. This claim elicited vigorous84
rebuttals from their opponents—most notably from Gardner, West and Wild (2011), who retort85
that “it is simply incorrect to claim that Hamilton’s rule requires restrictive assumptions or that86
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it almost never holds” (p. 1038). There is, at present, no sign of an end to this divisive dispute87
(see Nowak et al. 2011; Allen et al. 2013; West and Gardner 2013). It is hard to see how both88
camps can be right, yet neither seems likely to budge.89
Three versions: HRS, HRG and HRA90
The key to understanding the current standoff is to see that, when social evolution theorists91
talk about ‘Hamilton’s rule’, they may have a number of subtly different principles in mind.92
Hamilton (1964) first derived a result of the form ‘rb > c’ in a one-locus population-genetic93
model that made a number of substantial assumptions, including weak selection, additive gene94
action (i.e. no dominance or epistasis) and the additivity of fitness payoffs (i.e. a relatively simple95
payoff structure). In the following decades, numerous theorists (including Hamilton himself)96
explored the extent to which a similar result could be recovered when some or all of Hamilton’s97
original assumptions were relaxed. The upshot was a variety of different routes to ‘rb > c’-type98
results, often with contrasting implications about the conditions under which the rule applies99
(e.g. Hamilton 1975; Michod 1982; Grafen 1985; Queller 1984, 1992; Frank 1998, 2013; Rousset100
2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Lehmann and Rousset 2010, 2014a, b).101
Within this rather bewildering space of alternative formulations of Hamilton’s rule, one102
three-way distinction is particularly salient. It concerns the meaning of the ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’103
coefficients. First of all, there are formulations in which ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ denote payoff104
parameters of a specific evolutionary model. Examples include the formulations of Queller105
(1984), Taylor and Nowak (2007), van Veelen (2009), Nowak et al. (2010) and van Veelen et106
al (2012). Second, there are formulations in which the ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ terms are partial107
regression coefficients (i.e. ‘average effects’, in the sense of Fisher 1941) which quantify the108
overall statistical associations in a population between an organism’s genotype/phenotype, its109
fitness, and the genotype/phenotype of social partners—which can in principle be computed110
for any model or set of population data. Queller’s (1992) formulation is one example, recently111
defended and applied by Gardner et al. (2007, 2011). Third, there are formulations in which112
‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ refer to marginal, first-order approximations of regression coefficients. This is113
the approach most commonly used by contemporary kin selection theorists. Roughly speaking114
(since this is not the place for detailed mathematical exposition), the approximation works115
by replacing differences with differentials. That is, it approximates the regression coefficients116
corresponding to c and b with partial derivatives of a fitness function (Taylor and Frank 1996;117
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Frank 1998, 2013; Rousset 2004; Lehmann and Rousset 2010, 2014a, b).118
Some clear labels will help us keep these versions apart. For the exact version of the rule119
in which c and b are payoff parameters, we suggest the name ‘HRS’ (‘S’ for special). For the120
exact, regression-based version of Queller (1992), we suggest the name ‘HRG’ (‘G’ for general).121
For the marginal approximation of HRG, we suggest the name ‘HRA’ (‘A’ for ‘approximate’).122
Which version we have in mind makes an important difference to the generality of Hamilton’s123
rule. HRS is an exact result for any model with an additive payoff structure—that is, a payoff124
structure in which the payoff an actor’s behaviour confers on a recipient is independent of the125
recipient’s phenotype and combines with other payoffs by adding up. This, however, amounts to126
a significant restriction. It is easy to construct counterexamples to HRS simply by considering127
a non-additive payoff structure in which the payoff a given social action confers on a recipient128
does depend on the recipient’s own phenotype. This point was noted by Queller (1984) and129
has recently been emphasized by van Veelen (2009). Unsurprisingly, when the payoff structure130
of social interaction is too complex to represent with just two parameters (as is the case in131
non-additive scenarios), a rule more complicated than HRS is needed to describe the condition132
for a social behaviour to spread (Queller 1984; van Veelen 2009).133
However, if we define ‘c’ and ‘b’ as partial regression coefficients (as in HRG), we obtain a134
version of Hamilton’s rule of much greater generality. Indeed, we end up with an exact version of135
the rule that remains correct no matter how complicated the payoff structure may be, because all136
relevant payoff parameters are implicitly taken into account in the calculation of cost and benefit137
(Queller 1992; Gardner et al. 2007, 2011). In effect, this is because we are abstracting away from138
the complex causal details of social interaction to focus on the overarching statistical relationship139
between genotype and fitness. This generalized, regression-based version of Hamilton’s rule is140
always true because it makes no assumptions at all about how these statistical relationships are141
mediated phenotypically.142
The marginal approximation of HRG (i.e. HRA) sacrifices a degree of this generality, since143
the approximation of differences by differentials is justified only if selection is weak and gene144
action is additive (Frank 1998; Lehmann and Rousset 2014b). However, HRA does not pre-145
suppose an additive payoff structure, and it thus holds (unlike HRS) across a wide range of146
game-theoretic scenarios. The key is to note that HRA is fundamentally an approximate re-147
sult. Rather than assuming that the payoff structure is additive, HRA relies on the idea that,148
when selection is weak, a first-order approximation that neglects deviations from payoff addi-149
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tivity is justified. In broad terms, then, HRA provides an intermediate degree of generality. Its150
assumptions are more restrictive than those of HRG, but less restrictive than those of HRS.151
We can use this three-way distinction to make sense of the ongoing standoff. When Nowak152
et al. (2010) say that “Hamilton’s rule almost never holds”, they are referring to HRS, the153
exact version of the rule in which c and b refer to payoff parameters. Meanwhile, when Gardner154
et al. (2011) say that “it is simply incorrect to say that Hamilton’s rule requires restrictive155
assumptions or almost never holds”, they are referring to the exact, regression-based version156
employed by Queller (1992), Gardner et al. (2007) and others. Once we distinguish HRS from157
HRG, we see that both of these apparently contradictory statements are correct (Birch 2014b).158
Neither statement here is referring to HRA, even though this approximate version of the rule159
is the version most commonly used by kin selection theorists.160
Does HRG explain anything?161
Getting clear about the definitions of ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ does not wholly resolve the conflict162
over Hamilton’s rule, because underneath the terminological fog of war there are substantive163
issues at stake. One question is whether, if (as in HRG) we define the c and b terms so that164
Hamilton’s rule is always true, we buy generality at the cost of explanatory power. As far as165
Nowak et al. are concerned, HRG adds nothing to our understanding of social evolution:166
There are attempts to make Hamilton’s rule work by choosing generalized cost and167
benefit parameters [HRG], but these parameters are no longer properties of individ-168
ual phenotypes. They depend on the entire system including population structure.169
These extended versions of Hamilton’s rule have no explanatory power for theory or170
experiment. (Nowak et al. 2011)171
Do Nowak et al. have a case? It is undoubtedly true that HRG has predictive limitations.172
For example, one might expect Hamilton’s rule to predict that if we were to intervene to173
increase the genetic relatedness between social partners, cooperative behaviour would be more174
likely to evolve. But there are simple models in which the r, c, and b coefficients in HRG175
are all interdependent, with the result that intervening to increase relatedness also increases176
the cost/benefit ratio, making cooperative behaviour less likely to evolve. Similarly, one might177
intuitively predict that if a social behaviour satisfies Hamilton’s rule at one time, it will continue178
to do so in the future, provided there is no change in the underlying payoff structure or the179
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relatedness between social partners. But the c and b coefficients in HRG will typically depend180
on population gene frequency—with the consequence that a social behaviour may satisfy HRG181
at a low frequency but not at a higher frequency (Allen et al. 2013; Birch 2014b; Lehmann and182
Rousset 2014a).183
These concerns about the predictive limitations of HRG are real, but do not imply that184
it has no explanatory power at all. This is because, although prediction and explanation are185
related, they are not exactly the same thing. As philosophers of science have often noted, a186
principle can be explanatory without being predictive, and vice versa (Salmon 1989). In the187
philosophy of science, there is a long tradition of pointing to unification as an important aspect188
of scientific explanation (Kitcher 1989). In this spirit, some defenders of HRG have argued that189
it constitutes a unifying principle in social evolution theory which helps us see what otherwise190
disparate models have in common (Gardner et al. 2007; Birch 2014b).191
However, in addition to its unifying power, Hamilton’s rule is often also taken to embody192
an important causal insight about social evolution, namely that a costly social behaviour will193
spread only if the direct fitness effect of the behaviour on the actor who performs it is outweighed194
by the indirect fitness effect on the recipient, weighted by the relatedness between them, where195
‘effect’ is understood causally and not just statistically. This causal interpretation of HRG is196
valid only if the ‘c’ and ‘b’ regression coefficients admit of an interpretation as causal effects.197
It is not entirely clear when it is legitimate to interpret them in this way, because there is198
no general theory of when exactly a partial regression coefficient (or Fisherian ‘average effect’)199
admits of a causal interpretation. The debate is on-going, and connects in interesting ways to200
debates surrounding Fisher’s fundamental theorem (Lee and Chow 2013). What we do know,201
however, is that, partial regression coefficients are certainly not causally interpretable in all202
cases (Spirtes et al. 2000; Queller 2011; Allen et al. 2013; Birch 2014b). To think otherwise is203
to confuse causation and correlation. Indeed, Allen et al. (2013) provide several hypothetical204
examples in which a causal interpretation of the coefficients is not reasonable.205
By this point, it is clear that the debate has taken on a partly philosophical character, turning206
on subtle issues concerning the relation between causality and statistics, and the explanatory207
function that Hamilton’s rule is intended to serve. These are issues that neither mathematical208
modelling nor empirical studies can decisively settle. For this reason, debates about the value209
of HRG are unlikely to go away. But if researchers manage to steer clear of semantic confusions210
fostered by the alternative formulations of Hamilton’s rule, then there is room for a constructive211
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debate regarding the rule’s explanatory uses and limitations.212
The status of inclusive fitness213
Hamilton’s original 1964 paper introduced the concept of ‘inclusive fitness’, a modification of214
the classical fitness concept for dealing with social interactions. An organism’s inclusive fitness215
is defined as a weighted sum, over all individuals in the population (including itself), of those216
portions of each individual’s reproductive output for which the organism is causally responsible,217
with the weights given by relatedness coefficients. Hamilton observed that an altruistic action,218
which by definition will reduce an organism’s personal fitness, may nonetheless enhance its219
inclusive fitness; and he proposed that social evolution be understood as a process of inclusive220
fitness maximization. The status of the inclusive fitness concept is another bone of contention221
in the current controversy. Nowak et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2013) argue that the concept222
has no advantages over the traditional fitness concept. By contrast, Grafen (2006), Bourke223
(2011a) and West and Gardner (2013) argue that inclusive fitness is the key to understanding224
social evolution.225
Neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness226
Inclusive fitness is not the only way to formulate kin selection theory. As Hamilton himself227
noted, an alternative is to use ‘neighbour-modulated fitness’, which is in some ways a more228
intuitive notion. To see the difference between them, consider two viewpoints on what happens229
when altruism evolves by virtue of relatedness between social partners (Box 1). One is to230
view relatedness as a source of correlated interaction: when r is high, bearers of the genes for231
altruism are differentially likely to interact with other bearers, hence to receive the benefits of232
other agents’ altruism. Thus high r means that bearers of the genes for altruism may have233
greater reproductive success, on average, than non-bearers. The other is to view relatedness234
as a source of indirect reproduction: when r is high, recipients provide actors with an indirect235
means of securing genetic representation in the next generation. Thus genes for altruism may236
spread, if the indirect representation an altruist secures through helping its relatives exceeds237
the representation it loses through sacrificing a portion of its own reproduction success.238
The first perspective is captured in the ‘neighbour-modulated fitness’ framework (Figure 1),239
which looks at the correlations between an individual’s genotype and its social neighbourhood,240
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and helps predict when these correlations will make bearers of the genes for altruism fitter, on241
average, than non-bearers (Hamilton 1964; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998, 2013). The242
second perspective is captured in the ‘inclusive fitness’ framework (Figure 2), which adds up all243
the fitness effects causally attributable to a social actor—weighting each component by the re-244
latedness between actor and recipient—in order to calculate the net effect of a social behaviour245
on the actor’s overall genetic representation in the next generation (Hamilton 1964; Frank 1998,246
2013; Grafen 2006).247
248
[BOX 1 GOES HERE]249
[FIGURE 1 GOES HERE]250
[FIGURE 2 GOES HERE]251
252
Although correlated interaction and indirect reproduction may sound like different mecha-253
nisms, the inclusive and neighbour-modulated fitness frameworks are usually considered equiv-254
alent, as they generally yield identical results about when a social behaviour will evolve (Taylor255
et al. 2007). Thus the choice is one of modelling convenience, not empirical fact. Hamilton256
(1964) and Maynard Smith (1983) both regarded inclusive fitness as easier to apply in practice.257
But in recent years this situation has largely reversed: kin selection theorists have increasingly258
come to favour the neighbour-modulated fitness framework, citing its greater simplicity and259
ease of application (Taylor and Frank 1996; Taylor et al. 2007; Gardner et al. 2007).260
In one respect, the neighbour-modulated approach is more general. To perform an inclusive261
fitness analysis, we need to be able to attribute each social phenotype to a single controlling262
genotype (Frank 1998). By contrast, a neighbour-modulated fitness analysis simply ignores the263
pathway from actor genotypes to social phenotypes, leaving us with one fewer causal path to264
worry about. A corollary is that the neighbour-modulated framework can apply in cases where265
there is no principled way to ascribe a social character to a single controlling genotype. As Frank266
(1998, 2013) notes, cases in which phenotypes are controlled by actors of a different species to the267
recipient—such as host-parasite interaction—arguably fall into this category (though cf. Taylor268
et al. 2007).269
9
Inclusive fitness and the ‘objective’ of social behaviour270
One advantage of the inclusive fitness approach is that it helps to make precise the idea that271
organisms’ social behaviour is ‘purposive’, or goal-oriented. This idea of purpose, or apparent272
purpose, is a key component of the ‘adaptationist’ approach to evolution that Darwin initiated.273
Where non-social traits are concerned, biologists typically assume that an evolved trait will serve274
to enhance an organism’s expected reproductive output; models based on the assumption often275
enjoy empirical success. But altruistic behaviours seemingly do not fit this paradigm, as they276
reduce rather than enhance an organism’s personal fitness. It is here that the inclusive fitness277
concept comes into its own, allowing us to rescue the idea that social behaviour should appear278
purposive by suitably re-defining the ‘purpose’ in question, namely enhancement of inclusive,279
rather than personal, fitness. This feature of the inclusive fitness concept explains its popularity280
among behavioural ecologists, and has been emphasized in recent work by Grafen (2006, 2014),281
Gardner, West and Wild (2011), Okasha, Weymark and Bossert (2014) and others.282
What enables inclusive fitness to play this role is its focus on which actors control which283
phenotypes. Recall that an actor’s inclusive fitness is a relatedness-weighted sum of the fitness284
effects for which it is causally responsible. Thus we can put ourselves in the position of the285
actor and ask: ‘How should I behave, in order to maximize my expected inclusive fitness?’ Since286
natural selection tends to favour traits that promote inclusive fitness on average, this question287
can serve as an informal route to predictions of which social behaviours will evolve. By contrast,288
we cannot usefully ask the same question with regard to neighbour-modulated fitness, because289
an individual’s neighbour-modulated fitness contains components over which it may have no290
control. All we can do is put ourselves in the position of a recipient and ask: ‘What genotypes291
are “good news”, as far as my neighbour-modulated fitness is concerned?’ But this heuristic292
is considerably less intuitive, because considerations of causation and control are replaced by293
considerations of statistical auspiciousness.294
The idea that social behaviour should serve to maximize an organism’s inclusive fitness is295
hinted at in Hamilton’s original 1964 papers but not made fully explicit. In his recent work296
on the ‘formal Darwinism project’, Alan Grafen has attempted to place the idea on a firm297
footing, by proving formal links between gene-frequency change and an ‘optimization program’298
(Grafen 2006, 2014). Essentially, Grafen seeks to prove, in a quite general setting, that if all the299
organisms in a population choose an action (from a fixed set of possible actions) that maximizes300
their inclusive fitness, then population-genetic equilibrium will obtain; and vice-versa. While301
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(as Grafen admits) this falls short of proving that natural selection will always lead inclusive302
fitness maximizing behaviour to evolve (e.g. because gene frequencies may cycle indefinitely), it303
arguably provides some support for that belief. In effect, Grafen’s results (taken at face value)304
mean that so long as the population does actually evolve towards a stable equilibrium, then we305
should expect inclusive-fitness maximizing behaviour to evolve.306
Grafen’s results rest on one key assumption, namely that costs and benefits have additive307
phenotypic effects on fitness. This means, for example, that the benefit b that an altruistic308
action has on the recipient is independent of the recipient’s own genotype. In general this is309
not a realistic assumption, as it rules out any frequency-dependence of fitness, though it may310
be a good approximation in certain cases. Whether Grafen’s results can be extended to the311
non-additive case has not yet been settled; see Lehmann and Rousset (2014a) and Gardner,312
West and Wild (2011) for conflicting opinions on this issue.313
At this point it is useful to recall the ‘general’ formulation of Hamilton’s rule (HRG), which314
as we saw defines the r, b and c co-efficients in such a way that the rb > c condition is always315
correct, irrespective of whether costs and benefits are additive or not. It is tempting to suggest316
that Grafen’s optimization results could be extended to the non-additive case, and thus made317
fully general, simply by defining inclusive fitness using the r, b and c terms of HRG. However318
there is a problem with this suggestion. For recall that an organism’s inclusive fitness is supposed319
to be fully within its control, i.e. to depend only the social actions that it performs. Since the b320
and c terms of HRG are functions of population-wide gene frequencies, the amount of inclusive321
fitness an organism gets from a given action would depend on the state of the population, if322
inclusive fitness were defined as suggested.323
This suggests that the generalization of Grafen’s results on inclusive fitness maximization to324
the non-additive case will be difficult to achieve. Further, it highlights the important difference325
between Hamilton’s rule itself—the statement of the conditions under which an allele for a social326
behaviour will be favoured by selection—and the idea that an organism’s evolved behaviour will327
serve to maximize its inclusive fitness. These two aspects of kin selection theory, though related,328
should be kept distinct.329
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Kin selection and multi-level selection330
Another dimension of the current controversy concerns the relation between kin and multi-level331
(or group) selection. Kin and multi-level selection provide seemingly quite different perspec-332
tives on social evolution. Kin selection, as we have seen, emphasizes the relatedness between333
social partners as the crucial factor mediating the spread of a pro-social behaviour. Multi-level334
selection, by contrasts, emphasizes the interplay of selection within groups and between groups335
(Price 1972; Hamilton 1975; Sober and Wilson 1998; Okasha 2006). Within any group, altruists336
will be at a selective disadvantage vis-a`-vis their selfish counterparts; but groups containing337
a high proportion of altruists may outcompete groups containing a lower proportion. So for338
an altruistic behaviour to spread, the between-group component of selection must trump the339
within-group component.340
The relation between kin and multi-level selection has been a source of controversy ever341
since it was first broached by Hamilton (1975). In earlier debates biologists tended to regard342
kin and multi-level selection as rival empirical hypotheses (e.g. Maynard Smith 1964, 1976;343
Dawkins 1976). But many contemporary biologists regard them as ultimately equivalent, on344
the grounds that gene frequency change can be correctly computed using either (e.g. Marshall345
2011; Lehmann et al. 2007; Frank 2013). Although dissenters from this equivalence claim can346
be found (e.g. Ho¨lldobler and Wilson 2009; van Veelen 2009; Traulsen 2010; Nowak et al. 2010),347
the majority of social evolutionists appear to endorse it.348
Formal equivalence349
To see the grounds for the equivalence claim, consider a simple model. A population of haploid350
individuals live in groups of the same size, within which social interactions occur (Figure 3).351
An allele at a particular locus codes for a social behaviour. Define pi = 1 if the i
th individual352
has the allele, and pi = 0 otherwise. The index i ranges over all individuals in the global popu-353
lation, irrespective of group membership. The population-wide frequency of the allele is p. The354
reproductive output (‘fitness’) of individual i, defined as the total number of surviving offspring355
it contributes to the next generation, is denoted wi. The average fitness in the population is w.356
Mutation is assumed absent.357
358
[FIGURE 3 GOES HERE]359
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360
Under these assumptions, the change in allele frequency over a single generation is given by:361
w∆p = Cov(wi, pi) (1)
This is a version of the Price equation (Price 1970); the full version includes an extra term,362
but we are entitled to drop that term here because our assumptions guarantee the unbiased363
transmission of alleles. The equation tells us that the allele, and thus the social behaviour that364
it codes for, will spread so long as Cov(wi, pi) > 0, i.e. there is a positive covariance between an365
individual’s fitness and its genetic value. This simply formalizes the core neo-Darwinian idea366
that genes associated with higher individual fitness will increase in frequency.367
Equation (1) is always true but not always useful, as the covariance term will often lack a368
natural biological interpretation (Grafen 2006; Okasha forthcoming). Kin and multi-level selec-369
tion can be regarded as alternative ways of decomposing the covariance term in (1) into more370
meaningful components. On the kin selection approach, we use a linear regression model to split371
the covariance term into components attributable to the direct and indirect fitness effects of372
the social behaviour under consideration (Queller 1992; Gardner et al. 2011). This allows us to373
straightforwardly derive HRG, the generalized version of Hamilton’s rule discussed above. On374
the multi-level selection approach, we split the covariance term into components attributable375
to selection within groups and selection between groups (Price 1972; Okasha 2006). This allows376
us to derive a principle that closely parallels HRG, according to which a costly social behaviour377
can spread by natural selection only if the selection for the trait between groups is stronger378
than the selection against the trait within groups. The details of these derivations are spelled379
out in Boxes 2 and 3.380
381
[BOX 2 GOES HERE]382
[BOX 3 GOES HERE]383
384
We can now see why kin and multi-level selection are often regarded as equivalent. In any385
group-structured population, the total evolutionary change can be decomposed using either the386
kin selection partition (equation 4) or the multi-level partition (equation 6). Moreover, it is easy387
to see that the kin selection criterion for spread of a pro-social trait (rb > c), will be satisfied388
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if and only if the multi-level criterion (between-group > within-group) is satisfied. Thus the389
two approaches are formally equivalent. Gene frequency change can be computed in two ways:390
by determining the magnitude of the between and within-group components, or the direct and391
indirect effects; both methods will always give the same answer. In effect, the two approaches392
can be seen as alternative ways of caputing the fundamental insight that positive assortment,393
i.e. altruists interacting preferentially with each other, is what is crucially needed for altruism394
to evolve.395
Recently, van Veelen (2009) and van Veelen et al. (2012) have challenged the received wisdom396
on this issue, arguing that the kin and multi-level selection are not formally equivalent, and397
that the latter is in fact more general than the former; see also Traulsen (2010). The HRS/HRG398
distinction introduced above again helps us understand what is going on here. What van Veelen399
et al. have shown, in effect, is that the special version of Hamilton’s rule, HRS, is not formally400
equivalent to the standard multi-level decomposition in Box 3. This is true but should come401
as no surprise, since HRS applies only under restrictive assumptions. Their argument does not402
threaten the equivalence results of Marshall (2011) and others, because these results concern the403
formal equivalence of the multi-level selection approach and the general version of Hamilton’s404
rule. Again, the key is to distinguish between the maximally general formulation of kin selection,405
i.e. HRG, and more specific formulations.406
In one respect, the kin selection approach is arguably more general than the multi-level407
approach. For the latter requires that individuals are nested into non-overlapping groups, as in408
Figure 3 above; this is necessary for the decomposition technique in Box 3 to apply (Hamilton409
1975; Okasha 2006; Frank 2013). Groups of this sort exist in some taxa, e.g. the colonies of410
many social insect species. But in other cases, individuals engage in social interactions with411
their conspecifics but there are no well-defined, discrete groups. The kin selection approach412
can handle such cases easily; indicative of this is that in deriving equation (4) above (Box 2),413
we did not make use of the fact that the individuals were nested into non-overlapping groups.414
Thus the claim that kin and multi-level selection are ‘formally equivalent’ requires at least this415
qualification.416
Choosing between them417
On a practical, day-to-day basis, social evolution researchers must decide which approach to418
use—and the formal equivalence of the two approaches does not imply that there is no principled419
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basis on which to choose between them. West et al. (2008) are emphatic on this point:420
At one level, kin selection and group selection are just different ways of doing the421
maths or conceptualizing the evolutionary process. However, from a practical point422
of view, it could not be clearer that the kin selection approach is the more broadly423
applicable tool that we can use to understand the natural world. This is because kin424
selection methodologies are usually easier to use, allow the construction of models425
that can be better linked to specific biological examples, lend themselves to empirical426
testing and allow the construction of a general conceptual overview. In addition,427
the group selection approach is not only less useful, but also appears to frequently428
have negative consequences by fostering confusion that leads to wasted effort (West429
et al. 2008, pp. 381-382).430
Is this a fair assessment? It is true that the kin selection approach (in both its neighbour-431
modulated and inclusive fitness guises) has received more theoretical attention than the group432
selection approach, and has been put to work in more empirical applications. For example,433
kin selection models can straightforwardly take into account class structure, whereby different434
types of social agent in a population have different reproductive value (Taylor 1990; Frank435
1998); and they are readily hooked up with the Taylor-Frank method, a powerful technique for436
the prediction of evolutionarily stable strategies (Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998). However437
this does not show that the multi-level approach is unworthy of a similar degree of theoretical438
attention or that it is inherently unsuited to empirical applications. Indeed, given that kin and439
multi-level selection are formally rather similar—they simply partition up the total evolutionary440
change in slightly different ways—claims that one approach is inherently superior to the latter,441
as proponents of each have argued, must be treated with a degree of scepticism.442
The widespread preference for kin selection may be partly due to multi-level selection’s asso-443
ciation with the flawed ‘good of the group’ tradition of the 1950s and 1960s, and the associated444
‘superorganism’ concept of which many biologists remain suspicious. It is undeniable that the445
careless appeal to group-level advantage as a way of explaining a trait’s evolution led to serious446
errors in the past; so biologists’ wariness of this mode of explanation is understandable. Kin447
selection is an ‘individualistic’ methodology that makes no explicit mention of group fitness or448
group advantage, so has often seemed preferable for that reason (e.g. Dawkins 1976). How-449
ever, this consideration should not be overplayed. Past errors not notwithstanding, multi-level450
15
selection has evolved into a respectable theory, and does not necessarily carry a commitment451
to the superorganism concept (which is, at best, defensible only in special cases such as clonal452
groups or highly advanced eusocial insect colonies; cf. Gardner and Grafen 2009; Okasha and453
Paternotte 2012). Moreover, the idea that kin selection is methodologically preferable to multi-454
level selection seems hard to square with their formal equivalence. Indeed, those who have been455
favoured kin selection on these grounds have typically not properly appreciated that equivalence456
(West et al. 2008 is an exception in this respect).457
It has recently been suggested that kin selection has a unique advantage over multi-level458
selection in that it comes with an associated ‘optimization principle’ (Gardner and Grafen 2009;459
Gardner et al. 2011). The suggestion here is that the concept of organisms maximizing their460
inclusive fitness, which permits social behaviour to be brought within the Darwinian paradigm,461
is the key insight of kin selection theory, but has no good parallel in multi-level selection theory.462
The putative parallel would presumably involve groups maximizing their ‘group fitness’, but463
this notion only makes sense for fully clonal groups, it has been argued (Gardner and Grafen464
2009, though cf. Okasha and Patternote 2012). This line of argument is interesting but not465
conclusive, given that the circumstances in which it has been shown that evolution will lead466
individuals to maximize their inclusive fitness are anyway fairly restricted, as emphasized above.467
Causal aptness468
Finally, we want to suggest a different sort of consideration that might help biologists choose469
between the kin and multi-level approaches in a given context. The basic thought is that,470
although kin and multi-level selection are equivalent as statistical decompositions of evolutionary471
change, there are situations in which one approach provides a more accurate representation472
of the causal structure of social interaction. For evolutionary biology, like other sciences, is473
interested in constructing causal explanations; ideally we want our descriptions of evolutionary474
change to capture the causal structure of the underlying selection process, as well as correctly475
computing allele frequency change. So although kin and multi-level selection may be formally476
equivalent, it does not follow that they are also equally good as causal representations.477
For example, suppose we are investigating a segregation distorter allele which also has dele-478
terious effects on the fitness of its bearer. It is very natural to describe the selection pressures479
operating on this allele in multi-level terms: at the gene level, there is selection in its favour;480
but at the organism level, there is selection against it. The formal equivalence of kin and group481
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selection suggests that, if we wanted, we could re-describe the whole situation in terms of the482
inclusive fitness interests of the allele, but it is not clear what we stand to gain in explanatory483
terms by doing so. On the contrary, this move would seem unhelpful: it would obscure the true484
causal structure of the scenario, which clearly involves two distinct levels of selection. When we485
are looking at selection occuring both between and within organisms, a multi-level description486
seems clearly more apt, causally speaking.487
However, there are other cases in which a kin selection description seems more apt from a488
causal point of view. Consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma-style scenario in which organisms interact489
in pairs and must choose whether to cooperate or defect. Suppose that genetic correlation490
between social partners leads to the evolution of cooperation. It seems natural to describe this491
in terms of kin selection: to say, for example, that organisms cooperate because it is in their492
inclusive fitness interests to do so. As Sober and Wilson (1998) point out, however, any such493
scenario may be re-described in the language of multi-level selection. For if we regard each494
interacting pair as a group of size 2, we can say that within each group defectors outperform495
cooperators, but groups with more cooperators outperform groups with fewer. Yet as in the496
previous example, it is not clear what we stand to gain from this rather strained description of497
the process. After all, these ‘groups of size 2’ may be highly ephemeral, coming into existence498
when the social interaction begins and vanishing as soon as it is complete. If this is the case,499
then they are ‘groups’ in name only, and describing this as a process of multi-level selection500
seems to sow confusion rather than insight.501
Plainly, our intuitions about these two examples do not constitute a full-blown theory of502
causal aptness; they do not provide any general recipe for deciding which description is causally503
superior in any given case. Nevertheless, they are enough to show that considerations of causal504
aptness do matter, if we want our theories and models of social evolution to embody causal—505
as opposed to merely statistical—truths. Developing a more adequate treatment of causal506
aptness remains an important direction for future work. Okasha (forthcoming) attempts a507
systematic analysis of the circumstances under which kin and multi-level selection offer better508
causal representations of social evolution, using tools from the theory of causal modelling (Pearl509
2009).510
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Conclusions and open questions511
There are many oustanding issues in the foundations of social evolution theory. We feel that512
progress on these issues is achieveable if rival camps of researchers are able to communicate and513
cooperate, rather than pursuing divergent research programs. In this overview we have tried to514
take an even-handed approach that identifies what both critics and defenders of kin selection515
have got right, while highlighting the ways in which theorists have at times talked past one516
another. We will close by highlighting three questions that we hope future work in this area517
will address.518
Q1: When do the c and b coefficients in HRG admit of a causal interpretation?519
In Section 2, we noted that the generalized version of Hamilton’s rule, HRG, defines the c and b520
coefficients using the statistical concept of regression. In effect, in applying HRG, we are fitting521
a plane to a three-dimensional cloud of population data describing each organism’s genotype, its522
social partner’s genotype, and its fitness; c and b are the coefficients which specify that plane.523
But can HRG tell us anything about the causal processes involved in the evolution of social524
behaviour, given that it is defined in purely statistical terms? For as Allen et al. (2013) have525
pointed out, following Spirtes et al. (2000), there are many cases in which regression coefficients526
should not be interpreted causally. The issue lies at the heart of the ongoing debates surrounding527
Hamilton’s rule, but a systematic treatment is currently lacking.528
Q2: How widely applicable is the idea that evolution will lead individuals to ‘try’529
to maximize their inclusive fitness?530
In Section 3, we noted that inclusive fitness appears to offer an ‘objective’ for social behaviour,531
as it is a quantity that is within the ‘control’ of the individual actor. However, the most careful532
attempt to justify the idea that evolution in social contexts will lead individuals to behave as533
if trying to maximize their inclusive fitness, due to Grafen (2006), rests on assumptions that534
severely limit its generality. It is currently unclear whether Grafen’s argument, or one like it,535
can be extended to cover non-additive scenarios and to cover frequency-dependent selection.536
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Q3: Under what conditions are kin and multi-level selection causally, as opposed537
to formally, equivalent?538
In Section 4, we noted that kin and multi-level selection, when formulated in general terms as539
alternative decompositions of the Price equation, are formally equivalent in that allele frequency540
change can be correctly computed in both ways. But intuitively, there are cases in which one541
is more causally apt than the other. However, a general account of causal aptness that goes542
beyond our intuitions in simple cases has yet to be constructed.543
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Figures and boxes649
Figure 1: Neighbour-modulated fitness. In a neighbour-modulated fitness analysis, we
ascribe to A those fitness components that correspond to its personal reproductive success.
Some of these components are influenced by the behaviour of B, C and D (as shown by the
arrows). A’s total neighbour modulated fitness is an simple sum of these components (3b),
plus a component corresponding to A’s own influence on its reproductive success (−c), plus a
baseline component independent of the character of interest.
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Figure 2: Inclusive fitness. In an inclusive fitness analysis, fitness effects are assigned to the
actors whose behaviour was causally responsible for them. A therefore retains the effect −c
for which it responsible, but loses the 3b units of personal fitness it received by virtue of its
interactions with B, C, and D. In compensation, it gains 3b units taken from the reproductive
output of B, C and D. To calculate A’s inclusive fitness, these new slices are weighted by the
actor’s relatedness to the recipient.
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- pi = 0
- pi  = 1
Figure 3: Individuals in a group-structured population. Black dots represent individuals
with the allele of interest, white dots represent non-bearers, and the larger circles denote social
groups.
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Box 1: Two ways to conceptualize the role of relatedness
Picture 1: Relatedness leads to correlated interaction. Two altruists (black) confer a
fitness benefit (B) on each other at a cost (C) to themselves. As a result, they are fitter overall
than two nearby non-altruists (white). Genetic relatedness can give rise to such patterns of
correlated interaction in a population, making altruists fitter (on average) than non-altruists.
Picture 2: Relatedness leads to indirect reproduction. An altruist (black) confers a
fitness benefit (B) on a related recipient (white) at a cost (C) to itself. The recipient does
not express the altruistic phenotype. However, it possesses conditionally expressed genes for
altruism, which it transmits to some of its offspring (as indicated by the dotted lines, which show
the genetic similarity between the actor and the recipient’s offspring). The recipient thereby
provides the actor with a means of ‘indirect reproduction’—that is, an indirect route to genetic
representation in the next generation.
650
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Box 2: Kin selection approach
wi = fitness of individual i
pi = genetic value of individual i
p′i = average genetic value of individual i’s social partners
Write wi as a multiple regression on pi and p
′
i:
wi = α+ βwp.p′pi + βwp′.pp
′
i + ei (2)






where βp′p is the linear regression of p
′ on p.
Re-label βwp.p′ and βwp′.p as ‘–c’ and ‘b’ respectively, and βp′p as ‘r’, to give:
w∆p =
direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−c)Var(p) +
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
rbVar(p) (4)
Equation (4) yields the generalized Hamilton’s rule (HRG):
∆p > 0 if and only if rb > c (provided Var(p) 6= 0)
651
28
Box 3: Multi-level selection approach
pjk = genetic value of j
th individual in kth group
wjk = fitness of j
th individual in kth group
Pk = average genetic value of k
th group
Wk = average fitness of k
th group






where Cov(Wk, Pk) is the covariance between the group means and
Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)] is the average of the within-group covariances between w and p.






Equation (6) tells us that
∆p > 0 if and only if Cov(Wk, Pk) > −Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)]
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